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Lives Lost to the Overseas Toy Industry:
A Call for Action
I. INTRODUCIION
On May 10, 1993, over two hundred women died in a fire
while making toys for American children. The fire took place in
a toy factory in Bangkok, Thailand, where governmentally imposed
safety regulations are seldom enforced. The factory, owned by
Kader Ltd. of Thailand, maintained no fire alarms, no sprinklers,
only a few fire extinguishers, and virtually no means of escape. As
a result, the only option available to the few workers not immedi-
ately burned to death was to jump out of windows from the third
and fourth floors.1
In developing countries like Thailand, labor is cheap. As a
result, it is considerably profitable for U.S. retailers to seek out
such countries as suppliers.' The Kader toy factory, which failed
to implement even minimal safety precautions to protect its
workers, is prototypical of a manufacturing facility in a developing
country. The circumstances surrounding the Kader fire serve as a
concrete reference point for purposes of proposing overseas
factory reform.
The blatantly hazardous conditions that contributed to the
Kader fire have motivated U.S. and international organizations
alike to call for stricter workers' safety measures in developing
countries Unfortunately, companies based in the developing
countries that own and operate factories like Kader often do not
have the financial resources to compensate injured workers.4
1. 20/20: Toys At Any Price (ABC television broadcast, July 30, 1993) (transcript on
file with the author).
2. U.S. Increases Imports of Foreign Toys, China Is Largest Exporter, ITC Study Says,
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 8, at 306 (Feb. 19, 1992) [hereinafter U.S. Increases Imports
of Foreign Toys].
3. WHO: Asia Must Match Rapid Economic Growth with Worker Safety, UPI, Sept.
13, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, UPI File. See also 20120: Toys At Any Price,
supra note 1.
4. Jeffrey Parker, Factory Lacks Money To Compensate Thai Fire Victims, Reuter
Libr. Rep., June 2, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File.
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Moreover, governments in developing countries lack incentive to
penalize inadequately maintained factories.5 Therefore, in order
to improve safety conditions in overseas factories, some means
other than the creation of a civil or criminal remedy must be
pursued.
This Comment proposes trade restrictions in response to a
human rights crisis overseas. First, this Comment briefly describes
the human suffering that U.S. toy companies bring about in
developing countries. Second, this Comment recognizes an
obligation on the part of the United States to reduce this suffering.
Third, this Comment suggests that the United States, consistent
with its often-stated governmental policy of opposing human rights
violations, should ban the import of toys produced under condi-
tions lacking certain basic safety precautions. Fourth, this
Comment addresses possible objections to such a ban on imported
toys based on the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
("GATT").6 This Comment argues that, unlike the recent U.S.
ban on imported tuna, which was found by a GATT Review Panel
to have violated GAIT provisions,7 the proposed toy-ban would
overcome GATT objections. Finally, this Comment concludes that
a ban on imported toys produced under inhumane conditions
should be pursued even in the face of an unfavorable GAIT
Review Panel decision.
II. THE OVERSEAS TOY FACTORIES
8
The Kader fire is not the only overseas factory fire to have
resulted in substantial loss of life; this past year, there were at least
three other well-publicized cases. On July 6, 1993, ten workers,
5. 1993 Was a Deadly Year for Southeast Asia Workers, PLAIN DEALER, Dec. 30,
1993, at 8F.
6. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947,61 Stat. All, 55 U.N.T.S.
187 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1948) [hereinafter GATT]. The most recent round of
GATI negotiations, the Uruguay Round, which concluded on December 15, 1993, added
nothing to the GATT in the area of worker safety. Labor Leaders, Maintaining NAFTA
Grudge, Blast GAT... , NAT'L JOURNAL'S CONG. DAILY, Mar. 17, 1994. See also
GATT--Key Elements at a Glance, Reuter Eur. Comm. Rep., Dec. 15, 1993, available in
LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File. This Comment, therefore, does not address the
Uruguay Round.
7. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Dispute Settlement Panel Report on
United States Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, 30 I.L.M. 1594 (1991) [hereinafter GATT
Panel Report]. See infra text accompanying notes 97-122.
8. This Comment uses the term "overseas factories" only in reference to factories in
lesser-developed Asian countries.
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mostly young women, died in a downtown Bangkok textile
factory.9 In November 1993, eighty-four workers died in a toy
factory fire in Shenzhen, China.10 The very next month, in the
nearby Province of Fujian, sixty workers died in a factory fire."
Like the Kader factory, these factories had subjected their workers
to conditions that would shock most Americans. 2 Overseas
factories typically are crowded facilities with very little ventilation
and with no means of escape in the event of an emergency. 3
Fire exits are often used for storage space, and fire hoses and fire
doors are often inoperative. 4
Unsafe construction also threatens the lives of overseas
factory workers.15  Buildings originally constructed to allow
evacuation and adequate ventilation are often modified to create
more rooms. This modification prevents escape access, reduces the
reach of fire hoses, and renders fire alarms and sprinkler systems
ineffective. 6 In the case of the Kader fire, poorly constructed
steel beams collapsed quickly in the flames."
Working conditions in overseas toy factories are intolerable by
U.S. standards. Neither U.S. law nor American public opinion
would permit U.S.-domiciled companies to manufacture their
products under such inhumane conditions-statutory penalties
would be imposed," and public protests would be triggered. 19
9. 10 Workers Die in Thai Factory Fire, CHI. TRIB., July 6, 1993, at N13. When the
fire broke out, the victims were asleep on the top floor of the factory. They were unable
to evacuate because the owner of the building had locked the door to the staircase. All
of the victims were between the ages of fourteen and nineteen. Id.
10. China Arrests Two HK Businessmen over Factory Fire, Reuter Libr. Rep., Jan. 14,
1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File. Two Hong Kong businessmen
and two Chinese factory officials were accused of locking the windows and doors of the
Shenzhen Zhili Toy factory to keep workers inside during business hours. Id.
11. Andrew Quinn, Fiery Deaths Spark China Call for Worker Rights, Reuter Eur.
Bus. Rep., Dec. 16, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File. Most of the
sixty workers were asleep one floor above the factory in a dormitory that was also used
to store textiles. The victims were smothered by poisonous gases from the burning textiles
before they could save themselves from the fire. Id.
12. 1993 Was a Deadly Year for Southeast Asia Workers, supra note 5.
13. Building Safety in Asia: Sitting in a Tinder Box, Bus. ASIA, Sept. 27, 1993,
available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File.
14. Id.
15. Reese Erlich, Report Will Say Thai Government Culpable in Fatal Factory Fire,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, July 8, 1993, at 9.
16. Building Safety in Asia: Sitting in a Tinder Box, supra note 13.
17. Erlich, supra note 15.
18. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Welansky, 55 N.E.2d 902 (Mass. 1944) (manslaughter
charge arising out of the "Cocoanut Grove" fire); People v. Harris, 134 N.Y.S. 409 (1911)
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No such penalties or protests protect workers in overseas toy
factories because U.S. toy retailers do not own these factories.'
United States retailers purchase the toys produced in the overseas
factories, thereby keeping the factories in business, but take no
part in ownership or control of the factories, thereby avoiding legal
liability for injuries to factory workers.
The appalling working conditions exist because they increase
the profitability of the overseas factories.21  Often, factory
workers are purposely locked inside the factories to prevent them
from leaving during business hours.22 Cheap, and usually illegal
structural alterations seriously jeopardize workers' lives.' In
addition, factory owners find it cost-effective to bribe safety
inspectors-what few there are24  into "looking the other way"
when it comes to workers' safety regulations.2 Even the cost and
trouble associated with providing safety information to workers is
more than factory owners are willing to incur.' In short, protect-
ing the lives of factory workers, mostly women with no alternative
sources of potential income, is not a concern for those in control
of overseas factories.
To make matters worse, this inhumane state of affairs shows
very little sign of improvement.27 This is partially due to inade-
quate pressure, governmental or otherwise, from within the
(manslaughter charge arising out of the "Triangle Shirt Waist" fire).
19. Major disasters in the United States resulting from inadequate safety measures
have led to urgent safety reform movements. See generally David Treadwell & John J.
Goldman, Blaze Kills 87 in N.Y Social Club, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 26, 1990, at Al. See also
Return of Sweatshops-They Flourish Anew, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Jan. 14, 1980, at
73.
20. Parker, supra note 4.
21. Mary Kay Magistad, Fatal Thailand Hotel Collapse Was an Accident Waiting to
Happen, Experts Say, WASH. POST, Aug. 17, 1993, at A28.
22. Charlie Fidelman, Filmmaker Focuses on Thailand's Sweat Shops, GAZETrE, July
29, 1993, at G4. See also Health Week: Thai Factories Often Unsafe Places to Work (CNN
television broadcast, Nov. 27, 1993) (transcript on file with the author).
23. Magistad, supra note 21.
24. In Thailand, approximately 35 inspectors are responsible for over 30,000 factories.
Building Safety in Asia: Sitting in a Tinder Box, supra note 13.
25. 1993 Was a Deadly Year for Southeast Asia Workers, supra note 5.
26. Sonya Hepinstall, Nowhere To Turn for Tired Asian Workers, Reuter Eur. Bus.
Rep., June 9, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File.
27. Less than two years after the Kader fire, which has been reported to be the
world's worst peacetime factory fire, Kader Ltd. has already constructed a new factory at
a new location in Bangkok. To avoid delaying the operation of the factory, Kader has
elected to ignore the local law requiring governmental approval prior to construction. Thai
Toy Firm in Fire Disaster Sets Up New Illegal Factory, STRAITS TIMES, Jan. 5, 1994, at 13.
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countries where the factories are located,' and partially due to
desperate attitudes on the part of the workers in such countries.
29
Governments of developing nations make little or no effort to
enforce their own safety regulations. Workers in these nations are
so worried about earning decent wages that the issue of safety
rarely even enters their minds.3"
III. ACCEPTING RESPONSIBILITY
The lack of safety precautions that led to the Kader fire is
reminiscent of conditions that were prevalent in many U.S.
factories prior to the labor reform movement of the 1930s.31 The
"industrial revolution" in the United States increased the demand
for unskilled labor and gave rise to factories packed with women
and children working under extremely hazardous conditions.
32
Although state and federal legislatures had passed laws to improve
working conditions in the early 1900s, initially, the U.S. Supreme
Court held such laws unconstitutional.33 The Court, which began
upholding "New Deal" legislation in 1937,' finally forced U.S.
manufacturers to provide safer conditions for their workers.
35
This shift in judicial and congressional attitude reflected a
growing intolerance in this country toward the practice of
28. A special commission appointed by Thailand's Prime Minister, Chuan Leekpai,
recently reported that the Thai Government, after inspecting the Kader factory prior to
the fire, approved the flawed construction and failed to follow up on known safety
violations. Erlich, supra note 15.
29. Factory workers in Asian industrial areas, especially Bangkok, tend to be young
girls from small villages who are desperate for money and willing to tolerate inhumane
working conditions. Fidelman, supra note 22.
30. Hepinstall, supra note 26.
31. Philip F. Feldblum, A Short History of Labor Law 1349-1967, 44 LAB. L.J. 67, 73
(1993).
32. Id. at 72.
33. See, e.g., Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Hammer
v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915); Adair v. United
States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908).
34. The Court's willingness to uphold President Franklin Roosevelt's "New Deal"
legislation was largely a result of political pressure. The threat of President Roosevelt's
court-packing plan is thought to have influenced the abrupt change in attitude on the
Court, known as "the switch in time that saved nine." LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 449 (1978).
35. See, e.g. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (upholding the Fair Labor
Standards Act); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (upholding the
National Labor Relations Act).
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exploiting workers to maximize profits. Today, a U.S. corporation
that fails to provide adequate safety precautions in its manufactur-
ing process risks incurring substantial penalties.3 6 Numerous state
and federal agencies have been established to protect the welfare
of factory workers by adopting and enforcing occupational safety
regulations. 37 Labor unions provide bargaining strength, thereby
placing the often conflicting interests of workers' safety and
corporate profit on equal footing.
In light of the gradual evolution of working conditions that
took place in the United States over the past century, it may seem
as though the most effective approach for the United States to
take vis-a-vis overseas toy factories is to sit back and allow
developing nations to evolve in the same way. Such a laissez faire
approach, however, would ignore the changes that have taken
place in the world since the U.S. labor reform movement.
In the early decades of the twentieth century, U.S. industrial
technology was unmatched by any other nation.3 8 As a result, the
relationship between industrial laborers and employers in the
United States developed without pressure from foreign countries.
At that time, there was simply no need for U.S. companies to
secure cheap labor from developing nations.
Today, however, cheap labor is both in demand and available
in nations throughout the world.39 Governments of developing
nations have little economic choice but to maintain the conditions
36. For example, the California Corporate Criminal Liability Act authorizes state
prosecutors to file felony charges against company managers who expose workers to a
"serious concealed danger." Such an offense is punishable by imprisonment for up to
three years, and a fine of up to $25,000 if the manager is a single individual, or a fine of
up to $1,000,000 if the manager is a corporation. CAL. PENAL CODE § 387(a) (Deering
1993).
37. See generally Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 652(5),
653(b)(1), 668 (1970). See also California Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1973,
CAL. LAB. CODE § 6300 (Deering 1993).
38. The early 1920s have been described as the time of the second industrial
revolution in the United States. This era saw the emergence of "electric light and power,
... the internal-combustion engine,... wireless communications, and synthetic, or human-
made, chemicals." THOMAS P. HUGHES, AMERICAN GENESIS: A CENTURY OF INVENTION
AND TECHNOLOGICAL ENTHUSIASM 296 (1989).
39. For example, Mexico is an excellent source of cheap labor, especially with the
recent passage of the North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFIA") on November
20, 1993. For a discussion of this increasingly attractive source of labor, see Tod
Robberson, Mexican Labor Shows Who's Boss; Workers Win Sui Now Own Factory,
WASH. POST, Nov. 16, 1993, at A24.
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that attract wealthy U.S. retailers.' Bringing about factory
reform in developing countries, therefore, requires that the United
States assume some responsibility for the toys that its retailers
distribute.
Apart from any similarities between the former struggles of
U.S. laborers and the current plight of workers producing toys
overseas, the U.S. policy of opposing human rights violations
41
should, alone, be sufficient justification for a ban on toys produced
under oppressive conditions. In the past, the United States has
defended a wide range of human rights causes throughout the
world, and has developed a worldwide reputation for being a
human rights protector.42
By the same token, when the United States has turned its
back on oppressed citizens of foreign nations, such indifference has
caused widespread criticism and even outrage. For example, the
media greatly criticized former President George Bush for vetoing
legislation that tied China's "most favored nation" trading status
43
40. A foreign labor expert in Bangkok recently stated, regarding inhumane working
conditions in Thailand, that the Thai Government is constantly concerned about being able
to "compete with Indonesia, with Southern China, with Vietnam. There's no money spent
on infrastructure, human or otherwise." Hepinstall, supra note 26.
41. Upon signing the Human Rights Week Proclamation of 1988, former President
Ronald Reagan described the U.S. human rights policy as "an effective instrument for
improving the lives of people, not an instrument for self-righteous self-satisfaction."
Remarks on Signing the Human Rights Day, Bill of Rights Day, and Human Rights Week
Proclamation, PUB. PAPERS (Dec. 8, 1988).
42. In a recent Los Angeles Times opinion, former Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger
described the United States human rights tradition as follows:
The fundamental motivation of U.S. human rights policy rests deep within
American tradition. No other nation has been so explicitly founded to vindicate
liberty or been populated as extensively by refugees. This experience has infused
U.S. foreign policy with a missionary quality. Other nations need to take this
attitude seriously; to most Americans, the national interest cannot be separated
from some concern for human-rights.
Henry A. Kissinger, There's More To U.S.-China Ties Than Human Rights, L.A. TIMES,
Mar. 27, 1994, at M2.
43. The most-favored-nation principle is "a provision incorporated into commercial
treaties whereby a country guarantees that it will grant to the other signatory, or
signatories of a treaty tariff concessions or other commercial advantages equal to those
given to the country to which it grants the most favorable treatment." Charles H.
McLaughlin, Most-Favored-Nation Principle, in THE GUIDE TO AMERICAN LAW 378, 378
(1984).
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to human rights conditions,' as well as for his arguably callous
treatment of refugees fleeing Haiti in 1992.' 5
The Clinton Administration has made a greater effort to
adhere to the U.S. pro-human rights tradition. In May 1993,
President Clinton became the first U.S. President to attach human
rights conditions, by executive order, upon future renewals of
China's "most favored nation" trading status.' According to
President Clinton, these human rights conditions mark "a new
chapter in United States policy toward China."'47 The renewed
vigor with which the United States now formulates its response to
human rights violations must be applied to promote action to
reform working conditions in overseas toy factories.'
There are three reasons for placing primary responsibility on
the United States for reforming hazardous toy factory conditions
overseas: (1) U.S. toy companies actively seek out developing
nations as suppliers in order to benefit from reduced production
costs; (2) the vast U.S. toy market places U.S. companies in a
position to influence these suppliers; and (3) the suggested
approach may simply be the only way to improve working
conditions in labor-intensive overseas toy factories.
A. Taking Advantage of Cheap Labor
Much of the public outrage in the United States resulting from
the Kader fire has been directed at U.S. toy manufacturers.
49
American toy companies such as Tyco and Hasbro purchase most
of their products from overseas suppliers. According to the
International Trade Commission Industry and Trade Summary of
November 1991,50 the highly labor-intensive toy manufacturing
44. Susan Cornwell, Bush Tells Congress He'll Renew China's Trade Status, Reuters,
June 3, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File.
45. David Haskel, Bush Stance on Haiti Seen As Cruel, Ineffective, Reuters, May 28,
1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File.
46. Exec. Order No. 12,850,58 Fed. Reg. 103 (1993); Michael Chugani, U.S. Spells Out
MFN Renewal Conditions, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Mar. 12, 1993, at 2.
47. Clinton Extends China's MFN for Another Year, Xinhua Gen. Overseas News
Serv., May 28, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File.
48. Advancing a consistent set of human rights goals "can be a powerful foreign policy
tool--one that buttresses American leadership and undermines American adversaries."
Robert Cullen, Human Rights Quandary; The Cost of Vagueness, FOREIGN AFF., winter
1992-93, at 79.
49. See 20/20: Toys At Any Price, supra note 1.




process has caused U.S. toy companies to shift production to
lower-wage countries and focus their domestic operations on
"development, design, engineering, distribution, marketing, and
management."51
The Summary also identified a recent increase in the relative
importance of Thailand, Macao, and Malaysia as U.S. toy suppli-
ers. United States toy companies are afraid of placing themselves
at risk by relying too heavily upon China.52 As a result, to help
satisfy the U.S. market, toy manufacturing facilities have emerged
in other developing countries, where safety precautions are likely
to be a low priority.53
B. The Power of the US. Market
The influential position of the U.S. toy market is most
noticeable as it relates to Chinese-made toys. In recent years, U.S.
labor and consumer organizations have exerted a great deal of
pressure, mainly in the form of highly-publicized boycotts, upon
Chinese toy manufacturers to discontinue their oppressive labor
practices.' 4 Pressure has also been applied through the recent
debate over whether to extend "most favored nation" status to
China. While the effectiveness of this pressure in decreasing
human rights violations in China is unclear, it has caused at least
some Asian toy manufacturers, including Kader, to move their
production facilities from China to Thailand.56
The gradual emergence of Asian-owned production facilities
in developing countries, coupled with an increased U.S. need for
alternative lower-wage suppliers, has forced developing economies,
such as that of Thailand, to work toward securing favorable trade
51. Id. at 2.
52. Id. at 3.
53. Prompted by the Kader fire, the World Health Organization ("WHO") recently
identified developing Asian countries as specifically in need of improved workplace
conditions. WHO: Asia Must Match Rapid Economic Growth with Worker Safety, supra
note 3.
54. Andrew Quinn, Pressure from Chinese Toy Boycott Felt, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 16,
1991, at D3; AFL-CIO, Consumer Group Boycott Toys Made in China by Children, Daily
Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 228, at A-1 (Nov. 26, 1991).
55. See McLaughlin, supra note 43. See also, Battles in Toyland-Industry Fights in
Favor of China Trade Status, SEATTLE TIMES, June 12, 1991, at G1.
56. See Quinn, supra note 54. Expansion also increased in Malaysia and Macao
between 1986 and 1990. Industry and Trade Summary, Toys and Models, supra note 50,
at 3.
19941
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treatment from the United States.57 These developing nations,
which continue to thrive so long as they are called upon to meet
the needs of U.S. consumers, stand to lose greatly if, through their
inhumane labor practices, they fall into disfavor with the United
States.5" This heavy dependence of foreign suppliers upon the
U.S. market has been a basis for criticism of U.S. compahies. For
example, Lane Kirkland, the president of the American Federation
of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations ("AFL-CIO"),
recently called for U.S. companies to assume responsibility for
lives lost in the Kader fire. According to Kirkland, U.S. toy
companies "profit off of the tragedy derived from the conditions
to which those young women were exposed, and they are responsi-
ble."
59
The American public's outrage at the inhumane working
conditions that caused the deaths of two hundred women is
justified regardless of whether the United States was, in any way,
involved. The extent of the outrage should not depend on the fact
that the victims were making toys specifically for the American
market. This fact should, however, increase the sense of responsi-
bility on the part of the American people, and motivate the United
States to prevent such disasters from reoccurring.
C. No Alternatives for Exploited Workers
The use of economic sanctions to protect human rights is not
novel.' The United States has applied this approach most
57. Under the U.S. Generalized System of Preferences ("GSP"), designated developing
countries are allowed to export certain products to the United States duty-free. 19 U.S.C.
§ 2461 (1984). In order to maintain its GSP status, Thailand is making an effort to
accommodate U.S. human rights concerns. Lessons from America, ECONOMIST, Jan. 29,
1994, at 38. In 1989, Hong Kong, the Republic of Korea, and Taiwan all lost GSP status.
In 1990, toy imports to the United States from each of these countries fell substantially.
Industry and Trade Summary, Toys and Models, supra note 50, at 8. See also Quinn,
supra note 54.
58. For example, since 1987, China has attempted to become a member of the GATT;
however, the Tiananmen Square massacre of 1989, which strained relations between the
United States and China, has greatly delayed further consideration of China's GATT
application. GATT Panel To Weigh Taiwan Membership as China's GATT Application
Falters, Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 15, at 635 (Apr. 14, 1993).
59. See 20/20: Toys At Any Price, supra note 1.
60. See, e.g., Generalized System of Preferences Renewal Act of 1984 § 503(b), 19
U.S.C. § 2462(b) (1988) (excluding from duty-free treatment under the Generalized System
of Preferences developing countries that do not take steps to afford their workers
internationally recognized worker rights); Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act §
212(c), 19 U.S.C. § 2702(c) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) (authorizing the President to consider
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notably to discourage prison and child labor practices in China.
The restrictions imposed upon China, however, have had only
marginal impact because they are tied to its "most favored nation"
status rather than targeted at a particular product.61 Further-
more, China, with its economic strength and historic sensitivity to
foreign intervention,62 is not inclined to bow to U.S. pressures.
With respect to developing nations such as Thailand, however,
restrictions targeted at a specific product may not only be effective,
but may well be the only way to reduce loss of life due to hazard-
ous working conditions.
Both legal and non-legal barriers prevent the victims of the
Kader fire and their families from suing U.S. toy companies.
American companies, after all, neither own nor operate the Kader
factory.63 As mere purchasers of Kader products, with no control
over the physical details of the manufacturing process, U.S.
companies owe no duty of care to the Thai factory workers.'
This forecloses the possibility of the Thai workers or their families
whether Caribbean countries have taken steps to afford their workers internationally
recognized worker rights in deciding whether to grant these countries trade preferences
under the Caribbean Basin Initiative). For a discussion of the above two U.S. trade
statutes as they relate to worker rights, see Jorge F. Perez-Lopez, Conditioning Trade on
Foreign Labor Law: The U.S. Approach, 9 CoMP. LAB. L.J. 253, 259-274 (1988).
61. The United States and China have agreed not to import or export products of
prison labor. Memorandum Of Understanding on Prohibiting Import and Export Trade
in Prison Labor Products, Aug. 7, 1992,31 I.L.M. 1071. Winston Lord, Assistant Secretary
of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, recently stated that China's "most favored
nation" trading status with the United States will only be continued if there is "satisfactory
implementation of the MOU [Memorandum Of Understanding] and overall progress on
human rights." China Fails to Implement Pact with U.S. on Prison Labor Exports, Officials
Say, Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 36, at 1490 (Sept. 15, 1993).
62. According to former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, "[a] prickly insistence on
sovereignty is a particular attribute of the Chinese government. In China, Western
intervention is perceived as an uninterrupted humiliation since the Opium wars." Kissinger,
supra note 42.
63. Parker, supra note 4.
64. The most plausible tort theory in this situation is vicarious liability, based on the
doctrine of respondeat superior, and the related doctrine of apparent authority. To owe
a duty of care to injured factory workers under the former doctrine, a U.S. company would
have to control the negligently maintained factory. That is, the factory would have to be,
in effect, an employee of the U.S. company. Murrell v. Goertz, 597 P.2d 1223 (Okla. Ct.
App. 1979). Under the latter doctrine, this duty would be premised on authority given by
the U.S. company to the factory to act on its behalf. Paintsville Hosp. Co. v. Rose, 683
S.W.2d 255 (Ky. 1985). See WILLIAM A. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS
460 (4th ed. 1971) (discussing the "control" requirement under the theory of vicarious
liability).
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bringing suit for negligence against U.S. companies in U.S.
courts.6s Furthermore, even if some novel theory of liability
based on a de facto agency relationship between the U.S. compa-
nies and Kader were pursued, given the "hands off" policy that
U.S. companies seem to cling to with respect to questionable labor
practices in supplier countries, such de facto control would be
extremely difficult to prove.66 Moreover, imposing liability upon
U.S. companies for injuries to Thai workers raises problems of
sovereignty.67
Other types of barriers prevent victims and their families from
suing the Thai factories. The company that owns the unsafe
factory may not have the financial resources to pay the potentially
massive damages associated with loss of life. This was precisely
the problem the victims of the Kader fire faced.' Furthermore,
the labor laws of the developing country may not be adequately
enforced.69
Neither the U.S. importers nor the unsafe factories themselves
face a significant threat of legal liability under U.S. law for the
lives they place at risk. Therefore, it is necessary to improve the
situation overseas by means other than civil litigation. In light of
the added problem of inadequate legal pressure from the supplier
country itself, the need for U.S. action becomes clear.
IV. THE PROPOSED BAN
The most obvious advantage of a ban on imports to improve
workers' safety conditions is that such an approach is consistent
with traditional notions of sovereignty. The concept of sovereignty
65. See PROSSER, supra note 64, at 143. To bring suit for negligence against a U.S.
company in a U.S. state court, the Thai workers or their families would have to show "[a]
duty, or obligation, recognized by the law, requiring the [U.S. company] to conform to a
certain standard of conduct, for the protection of others against unreasonable risks." Id.
See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281 (1977).
66. David Miller, President of Toy Manufacturers of America, stated with regard to
the Kader fire: "[Tihe responsibility for those factories is in the hands of those who are
there managing the factory." 20/20: Toys At Any Price, supra note 1.
67. In Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281 (1949), the U.S. Supreme Court held
that a U.S. law requiring overtime pay for work in excess of eight hours per day did not
extend to a private contractor on construction projects for the United States in Iraq and
Iran.
68. Parker, supra note 4.
69. W. Gary Vause & Nikom Chandravithun, Thailand's Labor and Employment Law:
Balancing the Demands of a Newly Industrialized State, 13 Nw. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 398,402
(1992). See also Erlich, supra note 15.
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necessarily includes the power to protect the interests of those
within the sovereign's territorial limits.7' With respect to a
regulatory ban on toys, if the sovereign deems certain products to
be manufactured in a way that violates minimal standards of
human decency, it is well within its power to exclude such products
from being sold and distributed within its territory.71 Not so
obvious, however, is whether there are valid reasons for singling
out toys in particular as the object of the ban, and when such a
ban should be triggered.
A. A Ban on Toys in Particular
Directing the proposed ban specifically at toys is justifiable as
a matter of both policy and practicability. The highly labor-
intensive nature of the toy manufacturing process,' coupled with
the fact that U.S. consumers are not willing to pay high prices for
toys, 73 tempts U.S. companies to cut costs by seeking out cheap
labor in developing nations.74 Furthermore, when workers are
70. See G.W. KEETON, THE ELEMENTARY PRINCIPLES OF JURISPRUDENCE 44 (2d ed.
1949). "Sovereignty, as conceived by Bodin, Hobbes, and Austin, has three main
characteristics: (i) Sovereignty within a state is essential; (ii) Sovereignty is indivisible; (iii)
Sovereignty is unlimited and illimitable." Id. (emphasis added). The concept of
sovereignty is explored extensively by political philosophers such as John Locke, Jean-
Jacques Rousseau, Immanuel Kant, and Thomas Hobbes. For a general discussion of this
concept as it pertains to these philosophers, see J.W. GOUGH, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT (2d
ed. 1957).
71. See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 88-119 (1974).
72. Toy assembly requires a significant amount of handwork, which increases the cost
of labor. Chris Kraul, Toy Companies Bullish on Border Plants, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 1, 1991,
at 9D. In 1991, Japanese toy producer Tomy LTD. closed down its Singapore toy factory
because further automation in Singapore was no longer feasible. According to Toshikuni
Goto, Executive Director of Tomy Singapore, toy production is "very labor-intensive and
seasonal, and requires new products every year." Tomy Closes Singapore Plant, Lays Off
Workers, Japan Econ. Newswire, Nov. 14, 1991, available in LEXIS, News Library,
ARCNWS File.
73. Donna Leccese, Toy Manufacturers, Retailers Battle Profit Squeeze, PLAYTHINGS,
Jun. 1990, at 30. Leccese writes:
Consumers rely on their discretionary income to purchase toys and, therefore,
manufacturers have traditionally tried to keep prices low. Since the retail price
paid by the consumer ultimately reflects the plaything's production cost, toy
makers must minimize their costs, including those for labor and materials, to keep
prices low. This also helps protect manufacturers and retailers from severe losses
suffered as a result of a product's sudden downswing.
Id.
74. Industry and Trade Summary, Toys and Models, supra note 50, at 3. "Foreign
producers have a significantly competitive advantage over domestic producers in terms of
labor costs for manufacturing and assembly. Toy production, especially of stuffed toys, is
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp.L.J.
desperate and corruption is rampant, there is little incentive to
spend money on safety. Therefore, the very nature of the toy
manufacturing process invites dangerous conditions. Given the
stated U.S. policy of opposing human rights violations, 75 it seems
natural to target the industry within which the identified evil,
namely severely hazardous working conditions, is most blatant.
A ban on toys in particular is also consistent with public
policy because toys are a non-essential item. Unlike restrictions
on agriculture, fuel, or textiles, a ban on toys poses no threat to
the welfare of U.S. consumers. While U.S. toy retailers may feel
some economic impact from toy import restrictions, the negative
consequences to consumers are limited to an increase in the price
of toys. As disappointing as this may be for some American
children, it is a small price to pay when weighed against the
unnecessary loss of human lives.
In terms of practicability, singling out toys is likely to be
effective simply because foreign toy suppliers are dependent upon
the U.S. market.76 In addition, by targeting a specific category of
product, enforcement will be less burdensome, and minimum
safety conditions less difficult to determine.' Furthermore, a ban
directed at a narrowly defined category of imports such as toys is
likely to encounter less political opposition than a ban applied to
imports in general.78
B. Triggering the Ban
In order to be effective, a ban on toys must be carefully
structured. It should clearly identify the conditions that trigger the
ban, and these conditions should be as specific as possible.
Because the ban proposed in this situation is prompted by severe
human rights deprivations, it should only be triggered when
working conditions actually cause loss of human life. This
limitation has the dual advantage of providing a convincing basis
highly labor intensive. Pieces must be sewn together using a wide variety of patterns." It;
U.S. Increases Imports of Foreign Toys, supra note 2.
75. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
76. See supra text accompanying notes 54-59.
77. Monitoring a single type of manufacturing process allows a certain predictability
to emerge, making future violations easier to detect.
78. See Peter Overby, Trading Favors; While Congress Debates Trade Policy, Members
Quietly Lift the Barriers for Their Favorite Importers, COMMON CAUSE MAO., Spring 1993,
at 18 (discussing the influence of major toy retailers upon Congress' use of trade bills).
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for the ban, namely actual loss of human life, and of providing
easily applicable criteria for determining when the ban applies.
With this in mind, the ban on imported toys should take the
following form: the Secretary of Treasury shall ban the importation
of toys manufactured under conditions that result in accidental loss
of human life in excess of X number of lives per year;79 upon
triggering the ban, the factory in which the loss of life occurred is
presumed to have been negligently maintained. The burden is on
U.S. toy retailers intending to purchase toys from such a factory to
show, through documentary evidence, either of the following: (1)
that the deaths were not the result of inadequate safety measures;
or (2) that adequate safety measures have since been implemented.
The above formulation is consistent with the overall goal of
the ban in a few important ways. First, it ensures that only blatant
violations trigger the ban. The purpose of the ban, after all, is to
save lives. Countries are not required, or even expected, to
implement safety standards on par with those of the United
States.' They are, however, expected to take certain basic steps
to decrease the chances that their factory workers will die on the
job.
Second, the above formulation ensures that only negligently
maintained factories suffer the consequences of the ban. Basic
safety precautions do not always prevent work-related deaths.
Penalizing all factories that have accidents, regardless of the
existence of basic safety precautions, would not adequately single
out the facilities with truly inhumane working conditions.
Finally, the above formulation holds accountable the U.S. toy
retailers that keep the overseas toy factories in business. Overseas
79. The number of deaths designated by X will act as a "red flag," giving rise to a
presumption of a lack of minimal safety measures. The specific number of deaths required
to trigger the ban, while important, is not crucial for purposes of this Comment. This
number may be based on statistical data that reflects the yearly average of work-related
deaths that normally occur in factories with minimal safety measures in place. It may be
necessary to consider certain variables, such as a factory's production rate or the number
of workers a factory employs. Regardless of the specific calculations required, an
unreasonable number of deaths, whether uniform or contingent upon certain variables, is
obtainable.
80. In enacting the Generalized System of Preferences Renewal Act of 1984, Congress
recognized that it is unrealistic to require that "developing nations come up to the
prevailing labor standards of the United States and other highly-industrialized developed
countries." H.R. Rep. No. 1090, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5101, 5112.
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factories are often negligently maintained because of inadequate
enforcement of safety regulations."1 Placing the burden upon
U.S. companies to provide evidence of adequate safety measures
gives U.S. companies that are unable to provide such evidence two
options. They can either obtain their supply elsewhere,8 or urge
the country in which the unsafe factory is located to enforce its
own governmental safety regulations.
C. Implementation
Recent Thai labor reform has established a model mechanism
for implementing the proposed toy ban.' Although other
developing countries may not have labor laws as advanced as those
of Thailand, these countries will feel the economic consequences
of inadequate safety measures once U.S. toy retailers are prevent-
ed from purchasing toys from unsafe factories. Such countries are
then likely to develop regulations necessary to ensure that their
factories avoid the ban.
The labor law reform in Thailand began in March 1992, when
the Thai Cabinet created a Labor Welfare and Protection
Department to enforce workplace regulations." Such regulations,
previously unenforced due to lack of an official Labor Ministry,8
included general workers' safety measures.' Particularly relevant
to the proposed toy-ban is a provision that requires facilities with
100 or more workers to be monitored by a work safety officer.'
The work safety officer must have formal training in work
safety,'8 and is responsible for the following duties:
(1) insuring that employee safety is observed; (2) giving advice
and suggestions to employer and employee regarding work
safety; (3) supervising the use and operational condition of
safety equipment; (4) inspecting and reporting, for purposes of
81. Erlich, supra note 15.
82. Most major U.S. toy retailers already utilize low-cost Mexican labor. Chris Kraul,
Toy Makers Expanding Production in Mexico; Manufacturing: U.S. Companies Have
Steadily Increased the Scope of Their Maquiladora Operations in Recent Years, L.A. TIMES,
Jan. 16, 1991, at D6.
83. Vause & Chandravithun, supra note 69, at 398.
.84. Id. at 402.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 399.
87. Id. at 435.
88. Id. at 436.
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improved safety, the working conditions and employee perfor-
mance; (5) keeping records and making reports of accidents and
diseases that occur in relation to work; and (6) promoting and
supporting safety activities.'
Obviously, these measures are not currently enforced in a
manner sufficient to prevent disasters like the Kader fire.
Nevertheless, the fact that the Thai Government has adopted such
extensive regulations suggests a strong desire to protect workers'
safety. To ensure adequate enforcement, it may only be necessary
to provide some added incentive, namely, the avoidance of U.S.
import prohibitions.' Most significant for the purposes of the
proposed toy-ban is the fact that Thailand, a developing country
where factory conditions are extremely hazardous, already has a
regulatory structure set up to enforce the type of safety regulations
the toy-ban would be intended to promote. Avoidance of the ban
would simply require enforcement of Thailand's own law.
V. PROBLEMS POSED BY THE GATT
The GAT 91 may present an obstacle to the proposed toy-
ban, as it was founded on a policy that arguably prohibits this type
of economic regulation. The objective of the GATT is to promote
economic growth among member nations by reducing trade
barriers.' When trade barriers fall, nations are free to take
advantage of other nations' markets. This leads to increased
specialization because nations are then able to rely upon one
another for goods not efficiently produced at home. Increased
specialization, in turn, leads to more efficient production of
goods.93 Considering this policy of trade liberalization, implemen-
tation of a ban on toys may seem, arguably, to defeat the very
purpose of the GATT.
Specifically, one may argue that such a ban would violate the
GATr National Treatment provision in Article 194 and the
89. Id. at 435.
90. See generally supra note 57 and accompanying text.
91. GAT'T, supra note 6.
92. John H. Jackson, World Trade Rules and Environmental Policies: Congruence or
Conflict?, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1227, 1231 (1992).
93. Id.
94. The National Treatment provision requires importing countries to treat imported
products as favorably as they would if the same products had been produced domestically.
GATI', supra note 6, art. III. A ban on toys would seem to do just the opposite. Because
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prohibition of import and export restrictions in Article XI.9 To
comply with these requirements, the ban on toys must be shown
to be consistent with the rationale behind Articles III and XI, or
to qualify under one of the permissible exceptions listed in Article
XX.' A recent GATT Panel Report concerning a U.S. ban on
imported tuna addressed both of these issues in the context of
environmental trade policy.
A. The Tuna Dolphin Dispute
The "Tuna Dolphin Dispute"' provides a useful illustration
of the specific GAIT objections that the proposed toy-ban is likely
to face. The dispute between Mexico and the United States,
argued before a GATF Review Panel in 1991, involved Mexico's
objections to a U.S. ban on imported tuna caught in "purse-seine"
fishing nets." This ban was aimed at reducing the number of
dolphins killed in the process of catching tuna." Mexico's
objections to the tuna-ban would seem to apply equally to the
proposed toy-ban, or, for that matter, to any ban that focuses on
a production process.
1. The Rationale for the U.S. Tuna-Ban
The stated purpose of the U.S. ban on imported tuna, at issue
in the Thna Dolphin Dispute, was to reduce "the incidental kill or
incidental serious injury of marine mammals ... in the course of
commercial fishing .... .. "" The tuna-ban targets the fishing
technique that employs "purse-seine" nets because this technique,
when implemented in regions where tuna and dolphins are
commonly found together, results in the killing of dolphins in
larger numbers than the United States is willing to tolerate. This
problem is particularly severe in the Eastern Tropical Pacific
the ban would apply only to imported toys, the argument goes, it would treat imported
products less favorably than products manufactured in the United States.
95. Id. art. XI.
96. Id. art. XX. For the relevant text of Article XX, see infra note 113.
97. For a detailed discussion of the arguments on both sides of the "Tuna Dolphin
Dispute," see Elizabeth E. Kruis, Comment, The United States Trade Embargo on Mexican
Tuna: A Necessary Conservationist Measure or an Unfair Trade Barrier?, 14 LoY. L.A.
INT'L & COMp. L.J. 903, 913-22 (1992).
98. The U.S. tuna-ban is part of the Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, Pub. L.
No. 101-627, 102 Stat. 4467 (1990) (codified in part at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1407 (1988)).




Ocean0 1 and, as such, the tuna ban is primarily aimed at Mexi-
can commercial fishing practices.
2. Mexico's Objections to the Ban on Tuna
Mexico based its arguments against the tuna-ban on Articles
III, XI, and XX of the GATT.1" The ban, according to Mexico,
violates Article III because it discriminates against tuna imported
from Mexico solely on the basis of the process by which that tuna
was obtained. °3 While regulations on imports aimed at uphold-
ing product standards are allowed under Article III, regulations
directed at specific production processes are not.' Further-
more, the ban also violates Article XI, which clearly forbids
prohibitions on imports.'05 Finally, Mexico argued that the ban
is not included in Article XX's list of general exceptions to GATi
provisions.
3. The U.S. Response
The United States responded to Mexico's Article III objection
by asserting that the ban on tuna does not discriminate against
Mexico. Because tuna caught in "purse-seine" nets cannot lawfully
be sold in the United States" regardless of whether it was
caught by Mexican or American fishermen, the ban treats tuna
obtained by Mexican fisherman the same as domestically-obtained
tuna.' 7 Furthermore, the ban on tuna declares the tuna itself to
be unlawful and, therefore, counts as a regulation of a product
under Article III, namely, unlawfully obtained tuna.
To Mexico's Article XI objection, the United States responded
that only Article III covers the ban on tuna. The ban, according
101. GATT Panel Report, supra note 7, 1 2.2.
102. Id. 11 3.1(a)-(b), 3.34, 3.35.
103. Id. 3.16.
104. GATT, supra note 6, art. III. Such regulation puts the Mexican fishing industry
at a disadvantage and, thereby, undermines the National Treatment provision.
105. GATI Panel Report, supra note 7, 3.10.
106. Limited taking of dolphins is authorized when it is done pursuant to a permit
issued by the National Marine Fisheries Service. 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2). See also GATT
Panel Report, supra note 7, 1 2.4.
107. The United States went even further in defense of its provisions, arguing that
because of the 25% margin extended to foreign countries, and the maximum limit on
dolphin killings imposed only upon domestic fisherman, the ban on imported tuna actually
affords more favorable treatment to Mexican fishermen. GATT Panel Report, supra note
7, 1 3.20.
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to the United States, is best classified as a regulation affecting the
"internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribu-
tion or use" of tuna."~ Article XI, therefore, does not apply."°9
Finally, the United States argued that, even if the ban is not
valid under Articles III or XI, it is clearly valid as one of the
general exceptions in Article XX."0 Article XX(b) allows
import prohibitions "necessary to protect human, animal or plant
life or health." '' Because there is no other way to protect
dolphins killed by "purse-seine" nets other than by prohibiting
tuna caught using this technique, the prohibition is clearly
"necessary" to protect the lives of dolphins.
4. The Decision of the GATT Review Panel
The GAIT Review Panel found the U.S. ban on tuna caught
in "purse-seine" nets to be inconsistent with Articles III and
XI,"2 and not allowed as an exception under Article XX.113
108. Id. 1 3.11.
109. Id..
110. Id. 3.33.
111. GATT, supra note 6, art. XX.
112. The GAIT Review Panel focused primarily on 1 and 4 of Article III.
Paragraphs 1 provides in pertinent part: "[Q]uantitative regulations requiring the mixture,
processing or use of products in specified amounts or proportions, should not be applied
to imported or domestic products so as to afford protection to domestic production."
GATT, supra note 6, art. III, 1 1.
Paragraph 4 provides in pertinent part: "The products of the territory of any
contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less favorable than that accorded to like
products of national origin in respect of all laws, regulations and requirements affecting
their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use." Id. 4.
With respect to Article XI, the Panel focused primarily on 1 1 of the Article.
Paragraph 1 provides:
No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges, whether
made effective through quotas, import or export licenses or other measures, shall
be instituted or maintained by any contracting party on the importation of any
product of the territory of any other contracting party or on the exportation or
sale for export of any product destined for the territory of any other contracting
party.
Id. art. XI, 1 1.
113. GATI" Panel Report, supra note 7. Measures that qualify as Article XX
exceptions are as follows:
(a) necessary to protect public morals; (b) necessary to protect human, animal or
plant life or health; (c) relating to the importation or exportation of gold or
silver; (d) necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which are not
inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement ... (e) relating to products of
prison labour; (f) imposed for the protection of national treasures of artistic
historic or archaeological value; (g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible
natural resources ... (h) undertaken in pursuance of obligations under any
Overseas Toy Industry
The United States' Article XI argument was weak and unsupport-
ed, and the Panel rejected it with little explanation. The Panel's
decision with respect to Article III, however, deserves some
attention.
The Panel held that Article III allows regulations applied to
products themselves, but does not allow regulations applied to
production processes.'14 According to the Panel, a ban on
imported tuna that is contingent upon the way in which the tuna
is caught is not really a ban on the tuna itself, but a ban on a
process. The Panel reasoned that the regulations "could not be
regarded as being applied to tuna products as such because they
would not directly regulate the sale of tuna and could not possibly
affect tuna as a product.""11  Furthermore, the Panel decided
that, even if the ban were to be classified as a ban on the tuna
itself, such a ban would still violate Article III because it affords
less favorable treatment to imported tuna than to the very same
tuna obtained domestically.
1 6
The Panel based its rejection of the ban as an exception under
Article XX(b) on its conclusion that the Article XX(b) exception
for regulations "necessary to protect human, animal or plant life
or health" did not apply to humans, animals, or plants outside the
importing country."7 The Panel referred to an earlier draft of
Article XX(b), which read: "'For the purpose of protecting human,
animal or plant life or health, if corresponding domestic safeguards
under similar conditions exist in the importing country.""'" The
Panel held that this language in the earlier draft reveals the
intergovernmental commodity agreement... (i) involving restrictions on exports
of domestic material necessary to ensure essential quantities of such materials...
(j) essential to the acquisition or distribution of products in general or local short
supply ....
GATT, supra note 6, art. XX.
114. GATT Panel Report, supra note 7, 5.14. The Panel based this conclusion, in
part, on the way in which Article III has been applied in the area of border tax
adjustments. According to the Panel, "contracting parties may apply border tax
adjustments with regard to those taxes that are borne by products, but not for domestic




118. GATT Panel Report, supra note 7, 5.26. The Panel referred to a proposed draft
of Article XX(b) taken from the preamble of the New York Draft of the International
Trade Organization Charter. Id.
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drafters' intent for the exception to apply to conditions that exist
within the importing country.1 9
Furthermore, the Panel found that the tuna-ban also failed as
an Article XX(b) exception because it did not satisfy the necessity
requirement in the provision. 2 ' This provision requires that the
country invoking the exception exhaust all reasonably available
options consistent with the GATT before adopting regulations
contrary to the GAT.'' Because the United States and Mexico
had not entered into international agreements on dolphin protec-
tion, the Panel was not convinced that the tuna-ban was truly
necessary.122
B. The Proposed Toy-Ban Overcomes GATT Objections
The GATT Panel rejected the ban on imported tuna (1)
because it was inconsistent with the GATI"s overall goal of trade
liberalization, (2) because it was explicitly prohibited by specific
GATT provisions, and (3) because it did not qualify as an
exception. While the ban on imported toys this Comment
proposes is structurally similar to the tuna-ban, the purpose of the
toy-ban allows it to survive the above GATT analysis.
In the Tuna Dolphin Dispute, the GATT Panel focused its
Article III analysis on the principle of National Treatment and on
the process-product distinction. The Panel focused almost
exclusively on Paragraphs 1 and 4 of Article III, both of which are
intended to promote National Treatment by prohibiting regulations
"applied ... so as to afford protection to domestic produc-
tion. '23 The relevance of the process-product distinction, then,
at least in the context of Article III, seems to be based on the idea
that regulating products themselves (e.g., product quality stan-
dards) is legitimate under the GAT', but that regulating processes
(e.g., fishing techniques) is a form of economic protectionism. In
other words, the United States would be allowed, under the
GATT, to regulate tuna quality. When, however, the United
States implements measures that are not focused upon the




122. GATT Panel Report, supra note 7, 5.28.




its own fishing vessels an advantage over those of foreign vessels,
such measures are "applied so as to afford protection to domestic
production" and are, for this reason, invalid.
There is an obvious reason why the above Article III
objection would not apply to a ban on imported toys triggered by
severely hazardous manufacturing conditions. There is simply no
danger of giving U.S. domestic manufacturing processes a
competitive advantage because the major U.S. toy companies do
not manufacture most of the toys they sell domestically.124 There
would, therefore, be no de facto economic protectionist con-
cerns'15 and, thus, no violation of the National Treatment princi-
ples of Article III.
The proposed ban on toys would face a more serious Article
XI obstacle. Section 1 of Article XI specifically states: "No
prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other
charges ... shall be instituted or maintained by any contracting
party.', 126  To avoid this objection, the proposed toy-ban would
have to qualify as an Article XX exception. The failure of the
tuna-ban to qualify as such an exception will not prevent the
proposed toy-ban from successfully invoking Article XX.
The GATI Panel, in the Tuna Dolphin Dispute, rejected the
tuna-ban as an Article XX exception because the ban sought to
protect the lives of dolphins outside the jurisdiction of the United
States. Furthermore, the tuna-ban was not shown to be "neces-
sary" to accomplish this environmental goal. This criticism would
not apply to a ban on imported toys manufactured under severely
hazardous conditions.
The rationale for qualifying the proposed toy-ban as an
Article XX exception is implicit in the Article XX(e) treatment of
prison labor. Article XX(e) allows an exception to GATT
provisions when the regulation targets "products of prison
labor."'27 Prison labor is clearly a production process rather than
124. Industry and Trade Summary, Toys and Models, supra note 50; U.S. Increases
Imports of Foreign Toys, supra note 2.
.125. Some major U.S. toy companies, such as Mattel, Fisher-Price, Tonka, and Ertl,
own facilities in Mexico. Kraul, supra note 72. The ban would offer no economic
protection to these companies, as it would apply to all toys manufactured outside the
United States.
126. GATI', supra note 6, art. XI, 1 1. For the complete text of 1 1, see supra note
112.
127. GATT, supra note 6, art. XX(e). For the relevant text of Article XX, see supra
note 113.
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a product. Therefore, if not for the Article XX(e) exception, a
trade measure aimed at prison labor would be prohibited by
Article III.
The Article XX(e) exception would not make sense if it were
interpreted to apply only to domestic prison labor. A regulation
that outlaws domestic prison labor would not need to be included
as an exception to GATr" provisions because such a regulation
would have no effect upon imports and, thus, would not violate
GATT provisions in the first place. It is much more reasonable to
interpret the prison labor exception as an approval of a specific
type of process regulation, namely, one aimed at prison labor in an
exporting country. The prison labor exception is a clear expres-
sion of intolerance on the part of the drafters toward production
processes that violate human rights.
Like the prison labor exception in Article XX(e), the human,
animal or plant life or health exception set forth in Article XX(b)
is intended to allow for the regulation of foreign production
processes of a certain type, namely, those that threaten human,
animal or plant life or health. It would clearly be inconsistent with
this purpose to withhold application of the Article XX(b) excep-
tion from regulations applied to foreign labor practices that
actually kill people.
Unlike the tuna-ban, the proposed ban on imported toys
satisfies the Article XX "necessity" requirement. To understand
why this is the case, it is important to consider the differences
between the purposes of the two bans-the lives of dolphins on
one hand, and the lives of human beings on the other. It may be
prudent, at least politically, to work toward the gradual reduction
of incidental dolphin killings, rather than risk strained relations
with foreign governments. In contrast, there is an extreme urgency
about the protection of human lives that should outweigh concerns
about offending foreign nations. Given the appalling conditions in
overseas toy factories, immediate action is clearly necessary.
VI. SETIING A PosITrvE EXAMPLE
The obstacles that the GATT presents to the proposed toy-
ban are substantial. The underlying purpose of such a ban is
strictly humanitarian and may, therefore, seem too idealistic to
survive a GATT Panel review. There is, however, a solid
argument in support of a toy-ban, even in the face of an unfavor-
able GAIT Panel decision. Even if the proposed ban is blocked
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by the GATT, an effort to get the ban through the GATT is likely
to garner support from other countries, and this, alone, will have
positive effects on factory conditions overseas.
Strong evidence of this trend in following the United States'
lead in matters of economic activism can be seen in the response
of the European Community ("EC") to the tuna dolphin contro-
versy. Less than one year after the GATT Panel invalidated the
U.S. tuna-ban, the EC Commissioner in charge of fishing issues
introduced to the EC Commission a proposal for an embargo on
"tuna imports caught in nets that endanger dolphins."' 2 If the
EC tuna-ban is adopted by the EC Commission, the Commission
then plans to propose to the GATT member nations a worldwide
ban on imported tuna caught in nets dangerous to dolphins. 29
Whether or not there is ever a tuna-ban that can survive a GAIT
Panel review, the very act of proposing such a ban for a worthy
cause brings the issue to the attention of the international
community.3 ° Certainly, the proposal of a toy-ban would garner
even stronger support, as this ban seeks to save human lives. A
strong U.S. position on factory workers' rights sets a positive
example for other nations to follow, and is the first step toward
improving working conditions all over the world.
VII. CONCLUSION
United States companies and consumers benefit from the
continued operation of overseas toy factories. Because the U.S.
market for cheaply manufactured toys makes it possible for
overseas toy factories to operate in the first place, the United
States should accept responsibility for improving working condi-
tions in these factories. Without a way of attaching legal liability
to U.S. toy retailers, and in order to avoid invading the sovereignty
of developing countries, the most effective way for the United
States to bring about safer conditions in overseas toy factories is
simply to refuse to import toys unless they are manufactured under
humane conditions.
128. EC Commission Delays Action on EC Tuna Embargo Proposal, Int'l Trade Rep.
(BNA) No. 30, at 1259 (July 22, 1992).
129. Id.
130. EC Commissioner, Manuel Matin, in a press conference, reported having received
3,000 letters urging the protection of dolphins from the fishing techniques that endanger
their lives. Id.
1994] 759
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp.L.J.
While the toy industry is not the only industry that utilizes
labor-intensive manufacturing, it does seem to involve inhumane
working conditions more often than most other industries.t3'
Aiming a ban at an industry that is already known to violate
human rights is an important step in the right direction. A ban on
toys identifies a specific category of imports. Such specificity
allows it to avoid an overload of political opposition, and also to
be implemented according to narrowly defined terms.
The proposed toy-ban, undoubtedly a trade restriction, is
vulnerable to the objection that it is inconsistent with the trade
liberalization rationale behind the GATT. The ban is likely to
survive a GATT Panel review, however, because it is not proposed
for economic protectionist purposes, and because the drafters of
the GATT provided a specific exception to GATT prohibitions
when trade restrictive regulations are "necessary to protect human
... life or health.'
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American toy companies, as well as toy consumers, will
undoubtedly be asked to make some sacrifices. A willingness to
endure some short-term setbacks, however, is necessary to prevent
more serious long-term problems. With trade barriers falling
throughout the world, it is crucial for the United States to ensure
that its own labor standards become international labor standards.
Failure to raise labor standards throughout the world may
eventually force U.S. manufacturers in all industries to either
relocate to foreign countries or relax their own standards to
compete internationally.
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More significantly, a policy of intolerance toward human rights
violations would enhance the U.S. international image. Regardless
of whether overseas toy factories are owned by U.S. companies, or
even whether the toys they produce are actually intended for U.S.
consumers, these toys are symbols of America. The United States,
as a nation, suffers permanent damage each time images of "Bart
Simpson dolls"" together with burned-out buildings are broad-
131. See supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
132. GATT, supra note 6, art. XX(e).
133. See Perez-Lopez, supra note 60, at 279. Prior to the opening of the Uruguay
Round of GATT negotiations, "[c]oncern was growing in the United States that a
competitive advantage in trade sometimes derived from repressing the rights of workers."
Id.
134. "Bart Simpson dolls" were among the products that the Kader Factory produced
before it burned down on May 10, 1993. 20/20 Toys at Any Price, supra note 1.
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cast on television screens around the world.
conveyed to the world is that women and children







* This Comment is dedicated to my entire family. Throughout my college and law
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